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ARGUMENT 
THE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN 
INJURY AND THE NEED FOR SUBSEQUENT 
SURGERIES MUST BE DEMONSTRATED BY 
EXPERT MEDICAL TESTIMONY. 
Plaintiff has asserted that the fact that her surgeon umtd nui toi in .in 
opinion regarding H»e * IPM «>>t her need tor neck and wrist surgery should not preclude 
the jury from finding such a coi-.:•-.- .• nii11: ^ own testimony regarding 
her physical complaints. However, in all but ihe mo i^ nhvinus ot cases, testimony of 
h ;: esses regarding the need for a specific type of medical :. }uate 
to permit a jur- • •*: ..^:.srion. As stated by the COL;. ... Riggins \ Hecnic. 
Power Corp., 722 P.2d 819, X ^: v. *M, 
The need for positive expei t testimony to establish a 
causal link between the defendants' negligent act and 
the plaintiff's injury depends upon the nature of the 
injury. Where the injury ii wolves obscure medical 
factors which are beyond an ordinary lay person's 
knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a 
finding, there must be expert testimony that the 
negligent act probably caused the injiiry 
In the instant case, Ms. Beard had suffered horn neck \KU\\ and headaches 
for yeaib \ ... She had also complained of aching >i. n* f r 
surgeries took place many i accident in qi lestion. If her surgeon 
couldn't determine whether the conditioiis lot v\ IIH II lie operated were probably related 
ic III i injury at Kmart, how is a lay jury capable of u* :.. •. - . nnr^ 
guesswoik? Hssuiii . courts agree that the "diagnosis anu • - of 
1 
a disease are medical questions to be established by physicians as expert witnesses and 
not by lay persons". Eberhart v. Morris Brown College, 352 S.E.2d 832, 834 (Ga. 
App. 1987). 
Dr. Peterson testified that he operated upon plaintiff to attempt to alleviate 
a severe degenerative disease process which existed prior to plaintiffs accident at 
Kmart. He also testified that he had no opinion about any connection between the 
incident at Kmart and Ms. Beard's need for carpal tunnel surgery. In the absence of 
any other medical testimony on these issues, it was error for the court below to refuse 
to take the causation question from the jury. 
Plaintiff cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions suggesting that 
medical bills can be admissible and can support a finding that plaintiff incurred special 
damages for reasonable medical expenses, even without expert testimony that the 
treatment for which the bills were received was necessitated by the injury in question in 
the lawsuit. The issue in the instant case does not concern the admissibility of medical 
bills. It is whether the cause of the need for surgery must be established by a witness 
with sufficient expertise to form an opinion on that question. Because the issue is one 
which is beyond knowledge of a layman, expert medical testimony must be offered to 
support any verdict finding an accident to be the proximate cause of a plaintiffs need 
for surgery. This requirement can be demonstrated by the cases cited by plaintiff. For 
example, plaintiff cites Jordan v. Smoot, 380 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. App. 1989), for the 
proposition that expert testimony is unnecessary to establish a connection between an 
injury and its iivaiiiinii wiiile Jordan did so hold, it did so because the tre; 
a limited amount oi cl - ; r ? ,. . ; plaintiff received immediately following 
her accident. This, the court had, uibV•<<:; -ni one like Eberhart v. 
Morris Brown College. 352 S.E.2d 832 (Ga.App. 1987), • f" medical question 
was pn.\s<Mik\I In Eberhart, the court upheld a directed verdict against the pl.onutt lor 
failing to present any medical tesiunony establishing the connection between his injury 
and his subsequent treatment sometime ihett\i!fn , NIOUH*? ihat Georgia has a statute 
tha authorizes the admission of medical bills, the court -a a,a ^a a 
stai »;ff to prove medical issues b> lay lesuinui: 
held thai It W d 5 , ! " ' : CLa the verdict against plaintiff. 
Had appellant addressed additional medical testimony 
that his subsequent physical condition was a possible 
resuli nf his prior lootball injury, the jury would 
perhaps have been authorized to award appellant 
those medical expenses as special damages that he 
sought. However, appellant produced no such 
medical evidence. Accordingly, the tiial court <i;d 
not err in granting a directed verdiu n\ tavui o\ 
appellee. 
.. > i: ,,\ ?.t 834-35. 
... .---ion of whether the need for a surgery is the proximate la-oili -»i t 
particular accident is siinpl\ IH*VI-n*• 'he common knowledge of lay people. It was for 
this reason that in Townsend v. Stamper 3()X S W ."M •!"• i Ky App. 1965), a case cited 
;jured party not only produced medic ,. -ar treating 
physici •* !•*• lat plaintiffs need for disc surgery was \ * ?. 
3 
injury in the automobile accident which was the subject of her lawsuit. 398 S.W.2d at 
49. 
In the instant case, the surgeon who performed plaintiffs neck and wrist 
surgeries was unable to form an opinion that those procedures were causally related to 
her injury at Kmart. It was, therefore, improper to permit the jury to speculate about 
the causation issue, and the court below should have instructed the jury that plaintiff 
had failed to prove that the surgeries were proximately caused by her accident at 
Kmart, as defendant requested. The failure to so instruct was prejudicial because it 
allowed plaintiff to suggest to the jury that she should be entitled to substantial 
compensation simply because she had to undergo these surgical procedures. The 
holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Moore v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Rd. 
Co., 292 p.2d 849 (Utah 1956), was precisely that failure to instruct the jury that 
plaintiff had not proved proximate cause between an injury and a particular medical 
condition required that the judgment be set aside and the case remanded for trial upon 
proper instructions. It is always prejudicial to allow a jury to consider claims for which 
there is no sufficient evidence. See, Mikkelsen v. Haslam. 764 p.2d 1384 (Utah App. 
1988). 
The failure of the Court to remove the issue of the causation for the neck 
and wrist surgeries permitted the jury to base its award, to some extent, on the 
happening of those events. As has been previously noted, it is prejudicial error to 
allow a jury to consider, in its award of damages, physical problems which have not 
4 
been established by expert testimony to have been proximately caused by the accident 
in issue. 
The jury was not instructed that it must find medical 
evidence establishing that the injury and/or surgery 
probably caused the hip pain and headaches [of which 
she was complaining]. This deficiency constitutes 
reversible error requiring a new trial on the issue of 
damages. 
Riggins v. Bechtel Power Corp.. 722 P.2d 819, 824-25 (Wash.App. 1986). 
The failure to remove the surgery causation issue from the jury obviously 
misled them into assuming, as plaintiff's counsel argued, that they were free to consider 
the need for such surgeries when calculating their damage award. A court's failure to 
direct a verdict on an issue, or to instruct properly, " . . . is reversible error if it tends 
to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party . . .". Mikkelsen, supra, 
at 1387. Our Supreme Court has expressly held that the failure to take away from the 
jury consideration of a claimed injury not supported by medical evidence is just such 
prejudicial error. Moore, supra, at 851. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff in this case is a woman who underwent numerous surgeries 
to various parts of her body, including her foot, knee, wrists and neck, after being 
struck in the head. Her neck surgeon acknowledged that he diagnosed her as having a 
degenerative disease of the cervical spine which she admitted to another physician had 
been limiting her activities for nine years. Given these preexisting problems, an 
5 
obvious question arose regarding in what way, if at all, the Kmart incident contributed 
to her need for the various and multiple surgeries. With regard to her neck and wrist 
surgeries, plaintiff offered no medical evidence that these procedures were the probable 
result of the Kmart incident. In the absence of such evidence, it was error for the court 
below to fail to direct the verdict on these issues and instruct the jury that plaintiff had 
not proved that the challenged surgeries were a proximate result of her injury at Kmart. 
Accordingly, the judgment entered below should be vacated and the case remanded for 
a new trial on the issue of damages. 
DATED thisi2%ay of July, 2000. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
M. Efavid Eckersley c^^^^^ 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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